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CASES NOTED
the federal courts because of the Zahn decision will never have their day
in court.
Hopefully, the Supreme Court will not approve this further restraint
on the effectiveness of rule 23 as a tool of judicial economy and effi-
ciency.35 Should such an unfortunate result arise, congressional modifica-
tion of the jurisdictional statute appears to be the only available solution.
ROBERT G. FRAME
CONSUMER WAIVER OF DEFENSES UNDER THE UCC
Defendants, husband and wife, purchased a new Dodge automobile
on an installment contract which contained a waiver of defenses against
the dealer's assignee. Three months later the buyers returned the car,
complaining that serious defects had not been corrected although the car
had been brought back for repairs six times. After repossession and sale
of the car, Chrysler Credit Corporation, the assignee of the installment
contract, sued for the deficiency. The purchasers raised the defense of
failure of consideration, and they requested a jury trial on all issues. The
trial court entered a judgment on the pleadings against the purchasers.
On appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, held, reversed
and remanded: An assignee of a retail installment sales contract who is
"too closely connected" to the retail merchant to be considered a holder
in good faith, cannot rely on the contract clause whereby the buyer waived
all defenses against the assignee. Rehurefk v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262
So.2d 452 (Fla. 2d Dist.), cert. denied, 267 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1972).
The court's interpretation of section 9-206' of the Uniform Com-
35. On February 20, 1973, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review
the Second Circuit's decision in Zahn. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 93 S. Ct. 1370
(1973).
1. FLA. STAT. § 679.206(1) (1971):
AGREEMENT NOT TO ASSERT DEFENSES AGAINST ASSIGNEE
Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for buyers or
lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer or lessee that he will not assert
against an assignee any claim or defense which he may have against the seller or
lessor is enforceable by an assignee who takes his assignment for value, in good
faith and without notice of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type which
may be asserted against a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument under
the chapter on commercial paper (chapter 673). A buyer who as part of one trans-
action signs both a negotiable instrument and a security agreement makes such an
agreement (emphasis supplied).
2. RESTATEMENT or CONTRACTS § 167 (1932):
(1) An assignee's right against the obligor is subject to all limitations of the
obligee's right, to all absolute and temporary defenses thereto, and to all set-offs
and counterclaims of the obligor which would have been available against the
obilgee had there been no assignment, provided that such defenses and set-offs are
based on facts existing at the time of the assignment, or are based on facts arising
thereafter prior to knowledge of the assignment by the obligor.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), an assignee's right against the obligor
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mercial Code provides another answer to the problem of contractual
waiver of consumer defenses. This case is only the latest chapter in the
checkered history of finance companies' attempts to achieve immunity
from consumer defenses. The pre-UCC finance company was faced with
the rule that an assignee of a contract right was subject to those defenses
which the obligor could have asserted against the assignor.2 To counter
this, conditional sales contracts and finance agreements were designed to
afford the dual protections of negotiability and contractual waiver' in one
transaction. The waiver, although usually well hidden in text, was gen-
erally upheld in early cases, based on traditional theories of contractual
freedom and equality of parties.' Other courts have enforced the waiver
on the theory that it was used by the obligor to make the contract more
attractive to assignees, and the obligor was, therefore, estopped from
raising his defenses.5 Regardless of which theory the courts enunciated,
the underlying policy was to encourage business by allowing an innocent
purchaser of commercial paper to be free from purchaser claims. To this
end, The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act6 codified the holder in due
course status, which insulated a party, who took an instrument for value
and in good faith, from defenses of which he did not have notice. Today,
however, as the holder's degree of good faith decreases, the probability
increases that the courts will find a way to deny him protection from
consumer defenses.7
Before consumer protection came into vogue, many courts refused
to enforce waivers on the grounds that they violated public policy regulat-
ing negotiability of paper.' This rationale was generally used to protect a
victim of fraud, usury or other serious seller abuse,9 and to some extent,
consumers are still having success with this defense.' ° In a pre-UCC
is subject to all set-offs and counterclaims which would have been available against
the assignee if he were the original obligee.
(3) A sub-assignee's right against the obligor is not subject to the set-off or
counterclaim of a right of the obligor against a prior assignee unless the obligor's
right was acquired prior to any sub-assignment by the prior assignee, nor even in
that case if a sub-assignee claiming under such prior assignee is a bona fide pur-
chaser for value of the assigned right, without notice of the existence of the obligor's
right.
For an explanation of the underlying rationale see A. CORBIN, CoRBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 892,
895 (one vol. ed. 1952).
3. B. CLARK & J. FONSECA, HANDLINo CONSUMER CREDIT CASES 36 (1972).
4. Refrigeration Discount Corp. v. Haskew, 149 Ark. 549, 108 S.W.2d 908 (1937);
accord, RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 70 (1932). But see Williams v. Walker-Thomas Fur-
niture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965), representing a trend away from the Re-
statement position. This has been recognized also in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 23, comment b at 108 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964).
5. Baldino v. ABC Appliance Serv., 83 Pa. D. & C. 305, 307 (Philadelphia Cty. Ct.
1952).
6. Ch. 4524, (1897] Fla. Laws (repealed 1965).
7. Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
8. E.g., American Nat'l Bank v. A.G. Somerville, Inc., 191 Cal. 364, 216 P. 376 (1923).
9. Pacific Acceptance Corp. v. Whalen, 43 Idaho 15, 248 P. 444 (1926); Industrial Loan
Co. v. Grisham, 115 S.W.2d 214 (Mo. App. 1938).
10. Fairfield Credit Corp. v. Donnelly, 158 Conn. 543, 264 A,2d 547 (1969); Quality
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case'1 dealing with the related question of whether a finance company was
a holder in due course, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected a similar
negotiability argument, relying instead on an Arkansas case in which a
finance company was found to be too closely connected with the buyer to
be an innocent purchaser of the instrument.12
Other states have found the waiver to be contrary to public policy
relying on statutes which refuse to give effect to a purchaser's contractual
surrender of a right granted by law."8 While Florida has no statute pro-
tecting purchasers of consumer goods, and indeed section 9-206"4 could
be construed against such an argument, there are analogous provisions in
the Home Improvement Sales and Finance Act 5 which not only refuse
to give effect to a waiver, but make the inclusion of a waiver in a contract
punishable as a misdemeanor. 6
In this field of consumer contractual waivers, the courts have gen-
erally refused to disregard legal precedent, and apply a functional ap-
proach, 7 that would recognize the consumer's need for protection.
However, when more traditional rationale is available, courts have been
generous with pro-consumer dicta.'8
Prior to the instant case, the question of the validity of express
consumer waivers had not reached the appellate courts in Florida. Rather,
the case law governing an assignee's rights had been developed in the
context of whether the purchaser of negotiable paper was a holder in due
course. One requirement under the Negotiable Instrument Act for finding
a party to be a holder in due course was that he had taken in good faith.' 9
Fin. Co. v. Hurley, 337 Mass. 150, 148 N.E.2d 385 (1958); Toker v. Perl, 108 N.J. Super.
129, 260 A.2d 244 (1970).
11. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1953).
12. Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940).
13. Motor Contract Co. v. Van Der Volgen, 162 Wash. 449, 298 P. 705 (1931).
14. FLA. STAT. § 679.206 (1971). Section numbers throughout the text refer to numbers
of sections in the Uniform Commercial Code. The accompanying footnotes contain the cor-
responding section numbers in the Florida Statutes.
15. FLA. STAT. §§ 520.74, 520.99 (1971).
16. See also Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, creating FLA. STAT. § 516.31(2), which makes
assignees, who are small loan companies, subject to claims and defenses of consumers.
17. See generally Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. Rav. 809 (1935), dealing with the proposition that judges should base their deci-
sions not on abstract legal concepts and precedents but on the actual experience and verifiable
realities of the society.
18. E.g., Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649, 653 (Fla. 1953), based on the close
relationship doctrine. However, Justice Drew's pro-consumer dictum has been extensively
cited by courts and commentators alike:
It may be that our holding here will require some changes in business methods and
will impose a greater burden on the finance companies. We think the buyer-Mr.
& Mrs. General Public--should have some protection somewhere along the line.
We believe the finance company is better able to bear the risk of the dealer's ifi-
solvency than the buyer and in a far better position to protect his interests against
unscrupulous and insolvent dealers. . . . If this opinion imposes great burdens on
finance companies it is a potent argument in favor of a rule which will afford pro-
tection to the general buying public against unscrupulous dealers in personal prop-
erty.
19. Ch. 4524, [18971 Fla. Laws (repealed 1965).
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Pre-UCC cases in Florida adopted the holding of Commercial Credit Co.
v. Childs,20 that a close relationship between an automobile dealer and
a finance company precluded a finding of good faith. Instead of a holder
in due course, the court found that Commercial Credit Co. was "to all
intents and purposes a party to the agreement and instrument from the
beginning."'2' This rationale was cited in Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin
22
allowing a grocery store owner to assert failure of consideration against
a finance company bringing suit on a promissory note attached to a con-
ditional sales agreement for a defective deep freezer and a meat saw.
The court rested its conclusion on the fact that the assignee had pre-
pared and furnished the dealer with the printed forms for the sales con-
tract and promissory note. The finance company had also investigated
and approved the maker's credit, and had agreed in advance to purchase
the note if the sale were made. Because of this close relationship, the
court found that the finance company had constructive notice of the
security agreement's infirmity, and allowed the purchaser to interpose his
personal defenses.
In Industrial Credit Co. v. Mike Bradford & Co.,28 the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, broadened the close connection theory of
Mutual Finance. Based on a dealer-assignee relationship factually similar
to that in Mutual Finance, a purchaser of construction equipment was
allowed to set up a defense of failure of consideration against the finance
company, even though the purchaser and assignee had negotiated an ex-
tension agreement ten months after the sale, and notwithstanding the fact
that all parties were aware that half the equipment had not been delivered
because of title problems.24
In an apparent attempt to give a sounder explanation for the close
connection theory than prior Florida cases, the District Court of Appeal,
Third District, added a novel twist in the companion cases, bearing the
same name, of National State Bank v. Robert Richter Hotel, Inc.25 In
these cases, a close relationship was held not to be the element determina-
tive of whether the assignee of a conditional sales contract was a holder
in due course. Rather, the court stated that the issue turned on whether
the assignee controlled the dealer to such an extent that the dealer was
20. 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940).
21. Id. at 1077, 137 S.W.2d at 262.
22. 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1953) [hereinafter cited as Mutual Finance].
23. 177 So.2d 878 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) [hereinafter cited as Mike Bradford].
24. Murray, Negotiable Instruments, 22 U. MiAmi L. REV. 585, 587 n.7 (1968), having
criticized the Mike Bradford opinion as "rather cloudy" and the reasoning in Mutual
Finance as "obscure," stated:
It is not certain that the courts are denying a holder in due course status of the
finance company because of a presumption that the finance company had notice of
a defect in the underlying transaction, or because of a presumed lack of good faith
by the finance company.
25. 186 So.2d 321 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966); 188 So.2d 18 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966) [hereinafter
cited as Richter]; accord Westfield Inv. Co. v. Fellers, 24 N.J. Super. 575, 181 A.2d 809
(1962).
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acting as the bank's agent. Based on this "control" theory, the court in
the first Richter case held Mutual Finance to be limited and of "doubtful
value."26 However, the second Richter case cited Mutual Finance and
Mike Bradford, even though these cases were based on the "relation-
ship" theory, and did not contain the slightest mention of "cdntrol."
Less than six months after the second Richter decision, the UCC
entered the already confused Florida scene. Section 9-206(1)2" purports
to protect a bona fide assignee from the personal defenses of a buyer who
expressly waives defenses, or who signed a negotiable instrument and a
security agreement as part of one transaction. This section was made
"[s] ubject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for
buyers or lessees of consumer goods." According to Official Comment 2,28
the purpose of this sentence was to avoid taking a stand on the con-
troversial issue of whether a consumer could give up his personal defenses
through a contractual clause or execution of a negotiable instrument;
nevertheless, the court was squarely faced with this question in the
instant case.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, had a variety of
options available. It could have followed the reasoning of Section
9-206 (1)29 which upholds waivers in a consumer setting where there are
no statutes or decisions to the contrary.30 This was the situation in
Florida."' However, the closely analogous cases of Mutual Finance,82
Mike Bradford8 and Richter, 4 involving transactions between business-
men, established a public policy of protecting obligors from bad faith
assignees, which a fortiori ought to be extended to consumers.
Another possible approach to the problem had been presented in
Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurty.85 This case, on the one hand, appeared to
uphold the validity of a waiver of defenses, but still allowed recission of
the contract in equity because the waiver left the buyer with no legal
remedy.
There were, however, two other alternative theories of reasoning
which would be in keeping with the trend to protect consumers. First,
the court could have denied the validity of all waivers executed by
consumers, and relied on the wording of section 9-206(1),86 since there
are no statutes or decisions to the contrary involving consumer sales in
Florida. This would also be in line with Official Comment 2" which states
26. 186 So.2d 321, 323 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
27. FLA. STAT. § 679.206(1) (1971).
28. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.9-206, comment 2 (1966).
29. FLA. STAT. § 679.206(1) (1971).
30. Jennings v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 442 S.W.2d 565 (Ky. 1969).
31. But see Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, creating FLA. STAT. § 516.31(2).
32. 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1953).
33. 177 So.2d 878 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
34. 186 So.2d 321 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966); 188 So.2d 18 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
35. 284 Ala. 283, 224 So.2d 638 (1969).
36. FLA. STAT. § 679.206(1) (1971).
37. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.9-206, comment 2 (1966).
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that section 9-206 takes no position on consumer goods waivers.8 Under
this rationale, a good faith assignee could still enforce a waiver against
a businessman obligor who presumably would not need as much protection
as a consumer.
8 9
The second alternative theory, and the one upon which the Rehurek
court relied, does not consider the opening phrase of section 9-206(1)."0
Instead, it concentrates on the provision that the assignee must be a taker
in good faith to enforce a waiver. In determining whether there was good
faith, the court rejected the assignee's contention that a mere close busi-
ness relationship, without any other inference of dishonesty, should not
be equated with lack of good faith. In addition, section 1-201(19),"
which takes a subjective view of good faith, was, apparently, unper-
suasive. 2 The court instead followed its objective, pre-UCC close relation-
ship theory, which was established for holders in due course of negotiable
paper and which had been bolstered by Unico v. Owen,4" a widely-noted
New Jersey case. Apparently, the Richter cases 44 have fallen by the
judicial wayside. The Rehurek court did not mention control and agency
as factors, but relied instead on several allegations to support a close
relationship: Chrysler Credit Corporation was formed exclusively for
the purpose of financing the sale of Chrysler products; it furnished the
forms for the sales contracts which contained preprinted assignments to
Chrysler Credit Corporation; it investigated the purchaser's credit rating;
and it "did all of the things which are enumerated in the cited cases45 to
bring them in close relationship with Brooks-Massey,"" the dealer.
The court's reasoning for applying the close relationship theory is
somewhat misleading. The decision purports to rely on Mike Bradjord47
38. See generally Marinelli, Negotiable Instruments and the Holder in Due Course of
Consumer Paper, 8 Am. Bus. L.J. 253, 257 (1970), stating that "in depriving a consumer
of his right to withhold payment the consumer is deprived of his most useful weapon."
39. Compare Murray, Security Interests and the Security of Your Clients Under the
U.C.C., Part I, THE BARRISTER LEGAL REFERENCE SERIES 2, with Note, The Status of U.C.C.
9-206-The Waiver of Defense Clause, 31 U. PnTT. L. REv. 687, 688 (1970). But see Eisen-
berg, Good Faith Under the U.C.C.-A New Look at an Old Problem, 54 MARQ. L. REV.
1, 2 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Eisenberg]:
[The day has passed when courts will close their eyes to the facts involved and
enforce a contract or transaction because it was purportedly entered into between
seemingly knowledgeable and experienced businessmen who considered themselves
to be in an equal bargaining situation when they entered into the transaction or
agreement.
40. FLA. STAT. § 679.206(1) (1971). In quoting what it felt to be the pertinent part of
the statute, the court deleted the words "[sjubject to any statute or decision which estab-
lishes a different rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods. . . ." 262 So.2d at 453.
41. FLA. STAT. § 671.201(19) (1971).
42. For a discussion of various theories of good faith, see Eisenberg, supra note 39.
43. 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
44. Cases cited at note 25 supra.
45. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1953); Industrial Credit Co. v. Mike
Bradford and Co., 177 So.2d 878 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d
405 (1967).
46. 262 So.2d at 454.
47. 177 So.2d 878 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
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as a precedent for refusing to uphold waivers. However, that case did
not involve an express contractual waiver, or one of the type contemplated
by section 9-206(1)." Rather, Mike Bradford was concerned with
whether an implied waiver or estoppel was raised by the purchaser's
execution of an extension agreement. Without ever deciding whether there
was actually a waiver, the court held that the assignee was not a holder
in due course and therefore could not enforce this kind of waiver even
if there had been one.
The consequences of the court's carrying over the good faith require-
ments of a holder in due course into the area of section 9-206(1)
waivers are twofold. First, the areas of application for section 9-206(l)o
will be almost non-existent, and the instant case will generally eliminate
the waiver's effect in cases where such a close connection is involved.
The second consequence of the court applying the good faith theory
will be that an occasional consumer may still find that he is liable to a
bad faith assignee. Since the court declined to directly say that waivers
are ineffective in consumer cases,5 the purchaser in each case will have to
prove a lack of good faith or notice of defect on the part of the assignee
before he will be able to raise a personal defense. This means that the
party most needing protection, the consumer who cannot afford extensive
discovery and investigation, will be the one most likely to suffer from the
inconsistencies of this case.
52
While it may have been preferable for the court to have explicitly
held that waiver clauses are not enforceable in consumer cases, Rehurek
is unquestionably a step in the right direction. In language similar to
that of Mutual Finance, the court declared that:
When a purchaser answers the inducements made in the tre-
mendous advertising campaigns carried on by the automobile
industry and purchases a new automobile, he has the right to
expect the automobile to perform properly and as represented.
If it does not, through no fault of his, it appears to us that he
should be allowed to seek redress . . . . After a thorough study
48. FLA. STAT. § 679.206(1) (1971).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. The NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT proposed by the National Consumer Law Center at
Boston College Law School, seeks to do away with the consumer waiver completely:
§ 2.406 Assignee Subject to Defenses
Notwithstanding any term or agreement to the contrary, an assignee of the rights
of the creditor is subject to all claims and defenses of the consumer arising out of a
consumer credit transaction or consumer lease.
Comment
This action makes ineffective and unenforceable agreements of consumers in form
contracts which waive their defenses against assignees. Thus the subterfuge used even
when holder in due course does not apply is not permitted at all (emphasis added).
NATIONAL CONSUMER AcT § 2.406 (1970).
52. Man v. Leasko, 179 Cal. App. 2d 692, 4 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1960), is an example of a
case where a consumer was unable to establish sufficient evidence to satisfy the court that a
close relationship existed, even though the assignee did a large business in buying the obligee's
commercial paper and it furnished him with the form contracts.
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of the financial transaction involved in this business, we do not
believe this opinion will in any way obstruct the free flow of
commerce. We do not anticipate that we are placing an undue
burden upon the automobile industry in requiring them to
shoulder the responsibility of making sure their products per-
form as they have been represented."3
In furtherance of this stated policy of allowing consumers to seek
redress, the courts would do well to abandon the tests of "close relation-
ship" and "good faith," of "control" and "agency," in a consumer setting
and, in the future, hold all such consumer waivers invalid per se.
STEVEN J. DELANEY
THE POLYGRAPH: SCIENTIFIC v. JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE
The defendant was indicted for perjury as a result of allegedly
making false statements under oath before a grand jury. He pleaded not
guilty to the charge and attempted to include as part of his defense an
offer of testimony by polygraph examiners, which he claimed would show
that he believed his allegedly perjurious statements to be truthful. After
hearing evidence on the value and reliability of polygraph tests, the
federal district could held: Testimony concerning the results of polygraph
tests by the court's expert or by the defendant's expert is admissible if,
and only if, the tests conducted by the court-appointed polygraph expert
indicate either that defendant was or was not telling the truth on issues
directly involved in the case. United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 784
(E.D. Mich. 1972).
The polygraph referred to is not a "lie detector"; simply stated, it
does not show when the subject is lying, but rather when he is telling the
truth.' More accurately, it records "physiological phenomena that may
be used as the basis for the application of a reliable technique for diagnos-
ing truth or deception."2 The theory behind the instrument is that a
person's autonomic nervous system continues to function normally when
he tells the truth, but that the necessity for concealment--either through
an outright lie or less than full disclosure-will result in observable stress
responses, especially when coupled with a fear of detection.
The machine generally used is actually a combination of several de-
vices which measure and record the body's reaction to stress. These de-
vices include a rubber tube placed around the subject's chest to record
53. 262 So.2d at 456.
1. For a thorough discussion of polygraph theory and technique, see J. REID AND F.
INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION (1966) [hereinafter cited as RE D & INBAU].
2. Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).
